The question on whether
decentralization in the mid 1980s has contributed to China’s economic success
opens many windows for debate. There
are articles that mention some arguments that fiscal decentralization has been
fundamental to China’s economic success as it has been asserted that this has provided
material incentives that encouraged and rewarded sub-national governments to
promote local economies. There is
also an argument that says that Fiscal decentralization hardened the budget
constraints of sub-national governments’ SOEs and thus made these SOEs more
efficient. But the general thought that I am trying to espouse here is to
present the other side of the coin asserting that China’s authoritarian
centralization helped speed the geographical spread of policies found to work
well. Simply put, the key
reforms that reshaped China’s economy began in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
before any significant decentralization had occurred. Hence, decentralization as a means for China’s economic
miracle is a myth.
But allow me to explore the
possibilities that this side of the coin is not a myth based from the
assumption that fiscal decentralization may be conducive to economic growth. My
experience as a bureaucrat in a local government unit has lead me to understand
that if few public goods entail nationwide externalities, sub-national
governments are likely to be more efficient in the production and delivery of
public goods. With this, we can also argue that decision-making on disbursements
at lower levels of government is more open to diversified local inclinations
and needs and, for that reason, more favorable to distributive competence and
effectiveness. Hence, I can claim
that decentralizing revenue responsibility for example to sub-national
governments to complement the expenditure tasks may also augment accountability.
It is held, therefore, that returns means should go with expenditure needs as faithfully
as possible, in that way stimulating revenue mobilization from local sources,
and improving a country’s overall fiscal position.
With these thoughts in
mind, maybe I can assume that decentralization, say on fiscal matters, allows
sub-national governments to conceal information about their financial position
and enables them to avoid revenue predation from the center ,thus allowing them
to retain the financial resources they would need for investments that will
help promote economic development. In addition, such ownership structure of
SOEs will somehow enable sub-national governments increasingly to mandate these
firms to provide public goods.
Hence, we can conclude that at least, such decentralization undertaking has
negatively affected economic growth as it encourages sub-national governments
to engage in protectionist behavior.
With enterprise ownership by local governments, it can provide
incentives to local governments to duplicate enterprises under their respective
jurisdictions so as to capture the revenues that would have otherwise consumed
to the central assets.
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